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INTRODUCTION
Can the issue of human (ir)rationality
contribute to the scientific study of reason-
ing? A tempting line of argument seems
to indicate that it can’t. Here it is. (i) To
discuss diagnoses of (ir)rationality arising
from research in the psychology of reason-
ing one has to deal with arbitration, i.e.,
the assessment of competing theories of
what a reasoner ought to do, if rational.
But (ii), by the Humean divide between
is and ought, arbitration is logically inde-
pendent from the description of reasoning.
And clearly (iii) the main goal of psycho-
logical inquiry is just such a description.
It follows that normative concerns about
diagnoses of (ir)rationality cannot serve
the proper scientific purposes of the psy-
chology of reasoning, and would better be
left aside altogether in this area. A recent
cornerstone for this debate is Elqayam and
Evans (2011). Part of their discussion is
devoted to voice precisely this criticism
of “normativism,” thus favoring a purely
“descriptivist” approach in the study of
human thinking. In our view, the above
argument is essentially valid, but unsound.
Premise (i), in particular, may have seemed
obvious but doesn’t hold on closer inspec-
tion, as we mean to show.
In reasoning experiments, participants
are assumed to rely on some amount of
information, or data,D. These include ele-
ments explicitly provided (e.g., a cover
story), but possibly also further back-
ground assumptions. Note that, as a rule,
D is not already framed in a technical
language such as that of, say, probability
theory: cover stories and experimental sce-
narios are predominantly verbal in nature,
although they may embed more formal
fragments (e.g., some statistical informa-
tion). On the basis of D, participants then
have to produce one among a set of pos-
sible responses R, for instance an item
chosen in a set of options or an estimate
in a range of values allowed (say, 0 to
100%). Here again, the possible responses
do not belong to a particular formal jargon
(although, again, some formal bits may
occur in the elements of R).
Suppose that some particular response
r in R turns out to be widespread among
human reasoners and is said to be irra-
tional. Such a diagnosis, we submit, has
to rely on four premises. (i) First, one
has to identify a formal theory of rea-
soning T as having normative force1. (ii)
Second, one has to map D onto a for-
malized counterpart D∗ belonging to the
technical language employed in T. (iii)
Third, one has to map R, too, onto a for-
malized counterpart R∗ belonging to the
technical language of T. This step implies,
in particular, that the target response r
within R be translated into its appropri-
ate counterpart r∗. (iv) And finally, one
has to show that, given D∗, r∗ does con-
tradict T. If either of (i)–(iv) is rejected,
the charge of irrationality fails. We thus
have a classification of the ways in which
1We emphasize that here we are not committed in any
way to the idea of T as a “computational model” or
a “theory of competence,” as they are often under-
stood. Such a move would risk to blur our current
analysis (we concur with Evans and Elqayam, 2011:
277, and others on at least this much). Of course, T
will be a formal system—say, classical probability the-
ory. But, according to (i), in order for a diagnosis of
irrationality to hold, T has to be taken as having nor-
mative force, namely, with an additional overarching
claim that a rational agent ought to comply with its
principles.
one can question diagnoses of irrational-
ity that may be attached to the results
of a reasoning experiment. Depending on
whether (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) is the main
focus of controversy, we will talk about
arbitration, data mismatch, response mis-
match, and norm misapplication, respec-
tively. Relying on this partition, let us now
consider three prominent cases in which
normative concerns have entered psycho-
logical research on reasoning.
EXHIBIT 1: THE SELECTION TASK AND
DATA MISMATCH
The debate on Wason’s selection task is
said to have sparked the rise of a new
paradigm in the psychology of reason-
ing (see, e.g., Over, 2009), and so it
seems a primary example of how progress
in this field can intertwine with diverg-
ing diagnoses of rational behavior (see
Sperber et al., 1995, though, for cautionary
considerations). In the standard version of
the selection task, four cards are employed
which have a letter on one side and a num-
ber on the other side. One can see the
letter-side of two cards (A and C, say),
and the number-side of the other two (4
and 7, say). Which of these cards would
one need to turn over to decide whether
the following statement is true or false? “If
there is a vowel on the one side, then there
is an even number on the other side.” In
the classical analysis of the selection task,
this statement was interpreted as a mate-
rial conditional and referred to the four
cards only. The statement would then be
true unless some of the four cards has a
vowel and an odd number. Accordingly,
the A and the 7 cards ought to be turned
over; the C and the 4 cards are of no use,
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logically. Participants often selected the 4
card, largely disregarding the 7 card, and
were thus charged of being irrational.
In Oaksford and Chater’s (1994, 2003)
work, however, the ordinary language sen-
tence “if vowel, then even number” is not
taken as a material conditional, but rather
as such that its probability is the condi-
tional probability that the card has an even
number on one side given that it has a
vowel on the other side. Moreover, the
conditional statement is referred to a larger
deck of which the four cards only represent
a sample and in which, finally, the occur-
rence of both vowels and even numbers
are assumed to be relatively rare. This radi-
cally different formal reconstruction of the
data D defining the problem has impor-
tant consequences. The implication that,
for instance, turning over a card showing
number 4 is irrational does not hold any-
more and an alternative normative analysis
is required (see Fitelson and Hawthorne,
2010). In our current terms, the key point
of this debate is a matter of data mis-
match. Importantly, no doubt needs to be
raised against the normative status of clas-
sical logic to make sense of this case. (A
parallel account could be given for non-
probabilistic approaches such as Stenning
and van Lambalgen’s 2008).
EXHIBIT 2: THE CONJUNCTION
FALLACY AND RESPONSE MISMATCH
Upon experimental investigation, individ-
uals often rank a conjunctive statement
“x and y” as more probable than one
of the conjuncts (e.g., x). For instance,
most physicians judge that a patient
who had pulmonary embolism is more
likely to experience “dyspnea and hemi-
paresis” than “hemiparesis.” Tversky and
Kahneman (1983) famously labeled this
a fallacy, because in probability theory
Pr(x ∧ y) = Pr(x) for any x, y, regard-
less of what information may be available.
Note that the latter clause prevents rescue
of the rationality of human judgment by
an appeal to data mismatch. In fact, in
debates about the conjunction fallacy, it
is response mismatch that has been relent-
lessly discussed. Given how fundamental
and startling this judgment bias seemed,
almost all conceivable worries have been
aired over the years. Maybe, in the pres-
ence of a conjunctive statement “x and y,”
pragmatic considerations led participants
to treat the isolated conjunct “x” as “x ∧
not-y.” Or maybe the ordinary language
conjunction “x and y” was mapped onto
a logical disjunction (“x ∨ y”), or a con-
ditional expression (“y, assuming that x”).
Or the quantities to be ranked were not
meant to be Pr(x ∧ y) and Pr(x) because
the reference of the ordinary language
term “probable” eluded the basic proper-
ties of mathematical probability. In each
of these cases, the suggested rendition r∗
of the modal response r (here: that state-
ment “x and y” was more probable than
“x”) would have not contradicted proba-
bility theory, thus deflating the charge of
irrationality.
Here again, there is no logical rea-
son to saddle this debate with any sub-
tlety concerning the normative appeal of
the target formal theory (classical prob-
ability) for human reasoning. And while
all of the above worries of response mis-
match had been already addressed by
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) (see, e.g.,
Girotto, 2011), their recurrent appear-
ance in the literature spurred the devel-
opment of more and more refined exper-
imental techniques leading to a better
understanding of this reasoning bias. (See
Wedell and Moro, 2008; Tentori and




In its simplest form (e.g., Kern and
Doherty, 1982), so-called pseudodiagnos-
ticity task provides participants with a
binary set of blank and equiprobable
hypotheses h and ¬h (e.g., two abstract
diagnoses), two pieces of evidence e and
f (e.g., two symptoms) and one likelihood
value, such as Pr(e|h) = 65%. Participants
have to select the most useful among
three further likelihood values, Pr(e|¬h),
Pr(f |h), and Pr(f |¬h). In the classical
interpretation of this phenomenon, partic-
ipants were said to have “actively chose[n]
irrelevant information [namely, Pr(f |h)]
and ignored relevant information [namely,
Pr(e|¬h)] which was equally easily avail-
able” (Doherty et al., 1979, p. 119). The
standard Bayesian framework was taken as
a benchmark theory sanctioning this con-
clusion. But the idea of so-called pseudo-
diagnosticity bias was seen by Crupi et al.
(2009) as a case of norm misapplication.
Crupi et al. (2009) offered formal ren-
ditions (D∗ and R∗, in our notation)
of the experimental scenario (D) and
the response set (R) that were consistent
with the classical reading of the task (so
they argued on the basis of textual evi-
dence). Thus no data or response mis-
match was invoked, in our current terms.
Crupi et al., submitted, instead, that the
relevant norms of reasoning had beenmis-
applied in the standard interpretation: far
from contradicting the benchmark theory,
the appropriate formal counterpart r∗ of
the participants’ modal response r in pseu-
dodiagnosticity experiments turns out to
be actually optimal for a Bayesian agent
(given D∗). Tweeney et al. (2010), in turn,
criticized this conclusion. However, they
outlined themselves a further novel the-
oretical analysis of the task and did not
try to revive the once popular interpre-
tation of the phenomenon in its origi-
nal form. To the extent that the latter
is now judged inadequate by all parties
involved, at least some theoretical progress
was made whatever the outcome of this
debate.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
According to a seductive argument,
debates on the (ir)rationality of par-
ticipants’ responses are better left out
of the psychologist’s outlook for they
would invariably led her to plod on the
shaky ground of arbitration. We have
challenged this assumption by means
of three key examples. The selection
task, the conjunction fallacy and pseu-
dodiagnosticity have been extensively
investigated in the psychology of rea-
soning, and all raised lively controversies
about human rationality. Yet, issues of
arbitration hardly played any substantive
role. Once properly reconstructed, the
relevant problem was not whether it is
rational to depart from the implications
of allegedly compelling normative theo-
ries such as logic or probability theory.
Instead, much of the research done with
these classical paradigms was focussed
on whether and how those implications
could connect with observed behavior
given that data mismatch, response mis-
match or norm misapplication may have
occurred.
Arbitration between competing norms
of reasoning is central to certain areas of
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philosophy but remains marginal in psy-
chological research, and for good reasons,
loosely related to the so-called is/ought
divide: arbitration does require specific
forms of argumentation that lie outside
the usual scope of empirical research
(see, e.g., Schurz, 2011; Pettigrew, 2013).
Concerns of data mismatch, response mis-
match and norm misapplication, on the
contrary, are amenable to independent
scrutiny in purely descriptive terms (be
that at the empirical or theoretical level).
Sometimes earlier charges of irrational-
ity and biased reasoning survived increas-
ingly stringent demands of this kind (the
conjunction fallacy is a case in point),
sometimes not (pseudodiagnosticity illus-
trates). Either way, a significant amount
of theoretical and/or experimental insight
has been achieved. We conclude that
normative concerns about diagnoses of
(ir)rationality can retain a legitimate and
constructive role for the psychology of rea-
soning.
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